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THE SURROGATES' COURT AND THE
NEW LAW.
Notwithstanding my uniform rule, faithfully observed for the
five years of my Surrogateship, not to say anything about the
Surrogates' Courts for publication, I have accepted the invitation
of the young editors of this periodical published in a great Catholic
university. There is, at this time, so much interest among lawyers
and law students concerning the operation of the new Surrogates'
Law of 1914 that even my own poor views about it are desired. I
hope that they will not be regarded as a breach of propriety, or a
violation of that proper reticence which I conceive to be due, at
all times, from an officer of justice charged with the administration
of a public law of the State. With this in mind, I shall be as
frank as possible. There are, perhaps, times when, as the great
dramatist puts it, "Sparing justice feeds iniquity".
I shall speak first of the general body of the probate law
administered in the Surrogates' Court. The -Probate Law of
England and New York has a very long history. Much that lies
at its base was formulated by ecclesiastics in the closes and the
quiet cloisters of the great Cathedrals where the Bishops held their
courts before the era of the English secession from the primacy of
Rome. Probate law, therefore, possesses, as I think to its great
advantage, certain fundamental doctrines of what is known as the
Scholastic philosophy, or that Aristotelian system developed and
modified by the genius of that very great and good man, St.
Thomas of Acquin. Every scientific system of law, as is the case
with every great religious system, has its correlated philosophy.
The development of the classical law of Rome is often said to owe
much to the Stoic philosophy. Certainly the law of the Canonists
in England and even the English common law and the law once
administered'in Chancery contain doctrines which harmonize with
no other philosophy than the Scholastic. That the Canon law
should so harmonize is not strange, for the old Courts Christian
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of England were long administered by ecclesiastics of the old
faith.
The Probate Law of England transferred to the Province of
New York, so long subject to the English Crown, was founded
on the classical Civil Law of Rome, as adapted by the Canonists,
with the help of Scholastic philosophy and the logic of the schools.
At the present day the primary sources of probate law are generally sought in the reports of the Ecclesiastical Courts, established
after the reign of the Eighth Henry of England. Most of the
modem doctrines of probate law are mere reiterations of principles found in these early reports. But when these reports of the
Ecclesiastical Courts were first published, the Civilians of Doctors
Commons had long succeeded to the Catholic Ecclesiastics of
former ages, but for a considerable space both derived their inspiration from the same sources, the Corpus juris, and the Corpus
juris Canonici. In many opinions of the Ecclesiastical Courts,
still cited in our courts of to-day, we find, consequently, references
to such books as Lyndwood's "Provinciale", "cui adjiciuntur
Constitutiones Legatinae Othonis et Othoboni, Cardinalium et
sedis apostolicae in Anglia Legatorum".
After Lyndwood's day came such works as Ayliffe's "Parergon
Juris Canonici" better adapted to the new regime in England.
These and other works of the same kind are by no means obsolete,
if the probate lawyer would resort to the fons et origo juris. I
always keep such books by me for occasional reference. One of
them I notice bess the book plate of a great modem probate judge
in England, unfortunately now deceased. Evidently its 'former
owner regarded these old books as a still authentic and inspiring
source of the modern law he administered so skillfully and satisfactorily in the England of our own times. It is in Lyndwood
that we find the origin of such common distinctions made in
English and American probate law as that between a testameat,
"testamentum" and a last will, "ultima voluntas". The history of
the debt due by the whole body of English law to the early
Catholic ecclesiastics has never been fully told. It would take a
person of no ordinary calibre to tell it properly.
In addition to probate law there is now administered in the
Surrogates' Courts of New York an immense body of chancery
law. It is applied in accounting proceedings, in guardianship
matters and in the course of the distributions of estates. There is
also a mass of statutory law partly derived from the redaction
of ancient statutes, but more generally from modern innovatory
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statutes. On this important part of the law administered in the
Surrogates' Courts it is not now necessary to dwell. It is generally more or less familiar to all lawyers who practice in the
Courts of the Surrogates.
The jurisdiction of the Surrogates' Courts of this State has
rarely received just or complete consideration. It is well known
that the jurisdiction of the Surrogates and its mode of exercise
have been a constant source of contention in our Courts for over
a century past. The history of the jurisdiction is fairly familiar.
I have had occasion to review it in many cases (In re Martin's
Will, 141 N. Y. Supp. 784, 788; 80 Misc. 4; Matter of Hermann,
145 N. Y. Supp. 291; 83 Misc. 283, and in prior cases there cited).
I have not, however, before this had occasion to remark that the
contentions ovpr the jurisdiction of the Surrogates present a most
curious parallel with the long contentions in England over the
jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts on which the original
Surrogates' jurisdiction in New York was closely modeled. In
both countries the ecclesiastical jurisdictions were abstracted by
other courts and never favored by hostile jurisdictions. The real
reason for this in this State is not familiar and has never been
told.
It is common knowledge, that in all the colonial possessions,
the tendency of the framers of the colonial governments was to
transplant the old established jurisdictions, familiar at home to
the original colonists. The substantive and the adjective laws of
the old countries were so combined as to make it difficult, by a
stroke, to separate them when transferred to the European colonies of America. Thus it was that New York received that part
of the jurisdiction of the old Ecclesiastical Courts of England,
which related to a succession to the estates of the dead. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of our era were not ripe for
innovations on the established legal order, and consequently few
changes were made when an old jurisdiction was transferred to
a new and subordinate transatlantic government. Naturally the
simpler needs and the less elaborated social structure of the colonies demanded some modifications and a less complex form of
law. But such modifications were rarely radical, and never hostile
to fundamental principles of the old law.
New York, being a Crown province, imitated, after the year
1683, the institutions and laws of England more closely than any
other European colony or plantation in America. New Jersey
as part of the original royal grant shared in this similarity. In
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Crown provinces this reproduction of old institutions and laws
was due to several political and constitutional causes which I need
not now stop to consider. It is not doubtful that the entire common law of New York, and even its early Statute law, present a
singular conformity to like law of the old country until about the
time of the Revised Statutes of this State, enacted in 1830. It
was pursuant to the mode of development already indicated that
the Prerogative Court of the Province of New York came ultimately to be invested with much of the jurisdiction of the old
Ecclesiastical Courts of England. The Surrogates of New York
were, at first, only delegates of the Prerogative Court. That the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was, in competent hands, influential and
in some respects superior to the jurisdictions of the common law
courts, a more enquiring and critical age is beginning to realize
in England, and possibly here. That in the hands of a competent
judge the jurisdiction in question was a delicate instrument of
great public usefulness, the history of the Ecclesiastical Courts of
England in particular now demonstrates. But unfortunately we
rarely comprehend the ingenuity of a mechanism until it has been
taken to pieces, and perhaps irretrievably spoiled.
Before the Revolution, the Royal Governor of New York
nominated and delegated the Surrogates for the Prerogative
Court in the various counties of the Province of New York. The
original jurisdiction of the Prerdgative Court and its Surrogates
was confined to matters cognizable in the Ecclesiastical Courts
in England. These matters were mainly -probates, administrations
and inventories. The jurisdiction thus transferred to New York
was limited by precedent and authority. Its limitations are to be
found in the decisions rendered in the old Court of Chancery and
in the Common law Courts known to the common law. It is important at this point to notice only that all such limitations tended
to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts properly vested with
a jurisdiction over successions by wills and from intestates. The
principles of these decisions were always regarded as-a part of
the common law in force in New York.
It is unfortunate that soon after the State government was
inaugurated; the higher courts began to ignore the fact, that in
the colonial epoch the intention of the law officers of the crown
had been to transfer to New York the trichotomous jurisdictions,
Chancery, Common law and Ecclesiastical, known in England,
and also that the framers of the State government had deliberately adopted this plan.
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The act to organize the Government of the State of New
York, Chapter 12 laws of 1778, continued the former ecclesiastical
jurisdiction exercised under the Crown, and recognized the Surrogates as continuing officers to be employed in the exercise of
that jurisdiction. It also regulated their future appointment.
Chapter 38, Laws of 1787 confirmed and continued the Act of1778 in principle. Chapter 38, Laws of 1787 first placed the jurisdiction of the Surrogates on a statutory basis; but that act
especially provided that the courts of the Surrogates, in the.
matters submitted to their cognizance by that act, should proceed
according to the course of the courts having, by the common law,
jurisdiction of the like matters, "provided that the same should
not extend to the inflicting any ecclesiastical pains and penalties
whatever". Thus it will be perceived, that the old Ecclesiastical
Courts were expressly made the exemplar for all proceedings and
practice in the Courts of the Surrogates in the State of New
York by the Act of 1787. The Act of 1801, however, omitted this
last unnecessary provision of the Act of 1787 as it was implied
by the Constitution and by the first section of the Act of 1801
(Chap. 77, Laws of 1801; 1 K. & R. 317). The next revision of
the laws of the State made no substantial change in the foundation
6f the Courts of Probate (1 R. L. of 1813, p. 444). It was, I
think, not first implied by Chancellor Kent in 1820, that the powers
and jurisdiction of Surrogates flowed from the Statutes of the
State (Goodrich v. Pendleton, 1 John Ch. 549), but since then,
the decisions on this point have been uniformly to that effect. The
real meaning of this, I attempted to explain in Matter of Carter
(74 Misc. 1). Ever since 1837 the tendency of legislation has
been to enlarge the statutory jurisdiction of the Surrogates (Isham
v. Gibbons, 1 Bradf. at p. 78).
The epoch of legal reform and the more radical recast of the
jurisdictions of the old Courts of Justice of New York begin in
this State with the Revised Statutes of 1830. It was the framers
of that wonderful Revision who first undertook to new model and
restate the entire jurisdiction of the Surrogates' Court of this
State, and their "Notes" are extremely illuminating on their attitude toward a historical jurisdiction of inherent excellence. The
revisers of the Revised Statutes are known to have been most
accomplished lawyers, and their work of revision is the most
notable reform in the common law up to that time made in any
common law country. It is no disparagement to remark that they
were not however especially familiar with the law and the practice
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of the old Ecclesiastical Courts, which they regarded as "hidden
mysteries" (see Revisers' Notes). But in this particular the revisers shared only the prejudices and the dislike of the common
law and the Chancery Bars of England. The education and art of
the Ecclesiastical Bar in the old country were fundamentally different from that of common law lawyers. The technical education of the Ecclesiastical lawyers began even at the universities,
and their technic was largely founded on the Civil and the Canon
laws, in so far as they were received in England. Thus the
Ecclesiastical lawyers had the advantage not only of a wider culture, but of an old scholastic legal philosophy, not always apparent,
although it is implicit in the old law. The accomplished Revisers
of 1830 knew the separateness of the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, and as individuals most of them disapproved of the Court,
its corpus juris, its procedure and its tiaditional philosophy. They
proposed consequently to annihilate the ancient jurisdiction and
procedure of the Surrogates' Courts and restate them on a very
different basis in the Revised Statutes. It was a large proposal to
blot out and restate the law of two thousand years; and as stated
by a Surrogate of more than a century ago the attempt created
unnecessary confusion (Kirtland's Sur. Pr. 1). This time,, however, the Revisers overshot -the mark, and in 1837 (Chapter 460)
their attempt was in a few lines undone, and the ancient principles
of the Ecclesiastical Courts were in posse substantially restored
to the Surrogates. Then it was that the Surrogates of this State
had their opportunity to equal or surpass the work of the Ecclesiastical judges in England. That they availed of the opportunity is
nowhere apparent. I have perhaps indicated some of the reasons in my decision on Gedney's will (142 N. Y. Supp. 157, 167).
It is a great misfortune for the Surrogates' Courts of this State
that the golden opportunity, so skillfully availed of by the
judges of the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, was lost. Had it
been availed of, the permanent future of the Surrogates' Courts
would be less uncertain than it is at present. In England the
influence of the Ecclesiastical Courts was great enough to affect
the entire jurisprudence of England, and this during a time when
the Surrogates' Courts in New York were without influence by
reason of a sterility and a commonplaceness, almost unparalleled
in the history of jurisprudence.
It is often, with some disdain, emphasized that our Surrogates'
Courts are statutory courts. But in this State there are no common law courts, or in other words there are no courts which owe
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their existence to the common law alone. All the judicial powers
in this State, at the present time, are either constitutional or statutory foundations. i. e., they are due primarily either to the Constitution of the State or to some statute of the Legislature. The
real extent of the jurisdiction of the Surrogates' Courts, and of
all our other courts, is due to a variety of ancient causes and historical accidents. There is no prescriptive jurisdiction in this
State like that of the Chancellor and the common law courts in
England, or that of the Praetors in the Civil Law system.
The reader must remember that the history of a court is a
history of its jurisdiction, not of the temporary and fleeting
shadows who hold the court for the time being. The history of a
jurisdiction may extend back indefinitely; it may involve the most
momentous factsin the history of a nation or a race. No other
American court besides the Supreme Court of the United States
has a jurisdiction which can be divorced from the long history
of English-speaking people. The Supreme Court of the nation
alone possesses individuality; it is sui generis and its jurisdiction
is inseparably connected with this nation, and with this nation
alone. When the final history of the Federal Supreme Court
comes to be written it. will furnish the history of this nation and
this nation only. Not so with the courts of this State; they are
mere extensions of jurisdicions as old as the race. All our
Courts in this State enjoy th borrowed or transmitted jurisdictions known to the common law. These have been enlarged,
restated, or diminished, by statute, but the jurisdictions themselves are historically dependent, not independent, of old sources.
Although the Surrogate in 1895 was at last formally recognized
by the Constitution of the State as a part of the permanent State
judicial system, his jurisdiction is not so recognized and it is held
to continue to depend on statutes (Matter of Carter, 74 Misc. 1;
Matter of Cornell, 75 Misc. 574). But we should note when
considering the statutory jurisdiction of the Surrogates of this
State that we encounter a singular anomaly. The Supreme Court,
which reviews it, has no inherent jurisdiction over matters of
which the Surrogate has cognizance, and irrespective of statute
no strictly appellate jurisdiction over Surrogates. It is, of course,
familiar that the Supreme Court has an independent superintending jurisdiction over all inferior tribunals by means of the old
prerogative writs, so as to prevent excesses. But the present
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in so far as it concerns matters
of which the Surrogate has original cognizance, is also wholly
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statutory. Without the Statute the Supreme Court would have
no power over testamentary or intestate svccession. In the same
way the jurisdiction of the. Court of Appeals to review Surrogates' matters is not inherent. Thus it offers no solution of difficulties to assert that the Surrogates' jurisdiction is statutory
when all the other courts dealing with such jurisdiction are equally
on a statutory basis. It is obvious that the contention over the
nature and extent of the peculiar jurisdiction of the Surrogates,
in matters relating to succession to estates of the dead, has not
always been discriminating and it has been often referred to too
narrow or mistaken principles. There are larger principles
equally applicable in the instance of the jurisdiction of the Surrogates; for example, that the powers and jurisdiction conferred
on the Surrogates should be given effect according to the original
intent to transmit to the Surrogates a peculiar jurisdiction, long
exercised in the territory of New York. Again when a borrowed
jurisdiction is conferred on a constitutional officer, the extent of
the jurisdiction and the mode of its exercise are of a very different
nature from a new jurisdictton, conferred on a non-constitutional
judicial officer by a statute particularly enumerating the powers
and duties of the officer and his mode of exercising them. I
alluded to a distinction of this character in Matter of Mayer (72
Misc. at p. 570). In some cases the undefined power of a Surrogate is to be determined by precedent and in others by a literal
construction of the statute (Matter of Work, 76 Misc. 403, 405).
It was certainly, I venture to think, open to the Courts of this
State to have viewed the jurisdiction conferred on the Surrogates with more indulgence than is often apparent from the law
reports. That great man, Surrogate Bradford, who first placed
the probate law of this country on rational and scientific grounds,
often pleaded unsuccessfully for the collateral powers which
precedent naturally annexed to this jurisdiction of the Surrogate.
Had his contention been heeded, the Surrogates' Courts would
have been much benefited.
While there is common law precedent for the hostility of
both the Courts and the legislature of this State toward the old
and honored jurisdiction, vested so reluctantly in the Surrogates
of this State, the action, or rather the inaction, of the Surrogates
themselves in executing and in sustaining their jurisdiction, with
one or two notable exceptions in the more populous parts of the
State, is less easily justified. We must remember that during the
same period of time in which the Surrogates' Courts have existed
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here, the Judges of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, vested
with the same jurisdiction as our Surrogates, and laboring in the
same atmosphere' of prejudice, triumphantly vindicated and
maintained the remnant of their jurisdiction with dignity and
learning. By their marked ability, the English Ecclesiastical
Judges made their jurisdiction renowned both at home and
abroad.
By reaction, their individual- accomplishments and
labours have thus benefited and even ameliorated the whole jurisprudence of England and America. Without their wise and
learned judgments, even the modern testamentary common law
of England and this State would be a far less consistent body
of law than it now is. That the Surrogates of this State ever
allowed a coordinate jurisdiction to gain such a monopoly of distinction was unnatural, for America has in other fields of legal
development produced a fertile crop of eminent lawyers. During
this same period Story, in America, illuminated the ancient equity
jurisdiction of England as Englishmen themselves never before
had done, while Wheaton restated the modern bases and scope of
international law in such a way as to attract the general consideration of Europe. At the same time the immortal Kent splendidly
restated for American application the entire common law in force
in North America. These are only sporadic instances of the
greatest technical skill in America. It is sfrange that the Surrogates of New York were willing to contribute so little to the
jurisprudence of America. If the later reports of this State are
filled with distrust of the Surrogates' jurisdiction and the mode of
its exercise, as they undoubtedly are, it must be confessed that
the distrust is not devoid of reason. It is possible that this default was not altogether that of the Surrogates themselves, but
one which the other State Courts and the Legislature must share.
But whatever the cause, it must be admitted that the influence of
the Surrogates of this State has been far less than it might have
been had their work been of a higher order. Whatever the Surrogates' administrative and practical usefulness may have been, and
I think they have been great, their constructive and technical
work, as well as their influence on the jurisprudence of America,
has with the exception of Mr. Bradford's been inconsiderable.
With this fact in view, we may proceed to the consideration of the
new bill drafted under the auspices of the Surrogates Association
and made a law on September 1, 1914.
Prior to 1914, Chapter 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had,
for more than thirty years, regulated in the main the jurisdiction,
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the practice and the procedure of the Surrogates' Court. Mr.
Throop, the draftsman of this notable Chapter, or rather its
r~dacteur (for it was only a redaction), possessed one advantage
for the work of codification: he was a thoroughly trained lawyer,
coming of a family of eminent lawyers in this State. Consequently he possessed not only technical skill but the best legal
traditions of the State, seeing its laws in that proper historical
perspective so essential to a correct parliamentary draftsman.
Concerning the qualifications of the draftsmen of the new Surrogates' law of 1914 now in force I know nothing, but I do know
that the Surrogates of the great County of New York, the principal centre of the United States in wealth and population, were
allowed no voice in that revision. Whether this was consistent
with the rights and interests of the people of the County, I
venture to doubt.
While it is highly probable that the Surrogates of the County
of New York could have added little of value to the latest revision
of the "Surrogates' Law", I personally much regretted their
inability to participate in a revision of laws so important .to the
community over which their jurisdiction extends. It had been
my good fortune to know well Mr. Throop, the draftsman of the
prior Surrogates' Law (Chapter 18, C. C. P.) as during his work
of revision we occupied the same offices and were intimate and
confidential. My well known interest iri theoretic legislation commended me in turn to the prior codifier, Mr. Field, who often honored me with professional employment, in connection with legal
reforms he had very much at heart during his notable and distinguished career, better recognized abroad than at home. The
Commissioners of Statutory revision who drafted the latest revision, the "Consolidated Laws" of this State now in force had, in
their turn, without any suggestion on my part, employed me professionally to prepare the first drafts of the Real Property Law
and the Personal Property Law for the present Consolidated
Laws of this State. Thus it happened that I was enabled to be
somewhat familiar with all the revisions of the laws of this State,
made during my own professional life, with the single exception
of the new Surrogates' Law of 1914, in which, by reason of my
official responsibilities as Surrogate, I was more interested than
in any of the others.
It was not, however, because of any such omission that I
strenuously opposed the enactment of the Surrogates' Law of
1914, but because after careful consideration of its content and
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tendencies I believed that it was not a genuine reform of the law,
or one in the right direction for the best interests of the good
people of this State. The new law inter alia increased the powers
and patronage of the Surrogates in ways which I believed fatal
to the improvement of the Surrogates' Court at least in the great
centre of population, and it perpetuated some features of the old
laws which I believed were not in the interests of an improved
judicial administration of the weighty interests committed to the
Surrogates of the County of New York. Moreover I objected
to the proposal to make two Supreme Courts in this State, one
charged with a jurisdiction over the affairs of the living and the
other charged with a jurisdiction over the affairs of the dead.
This novel division of jurisdictions seemed to me faulty and unscientific. It is what the scientific lawyers call a false dichotomy.
Whether or not I was in error in my conclusions time alone can
demonstrate.
Some of the ways in my judgment to reform and improve the
administration of the Surrogates' Court, in the great county of
New York, I stated to the recent Constitutional Convention when
invited to attend their Committee sitting in the City of Albany.
It seemed to me that if the Surrogates' Courts were to be retained
in this State as separate tribunals, and to this there could be no
real objection, if they were properly reformed, the natural differences between Surrogates' Courts holden for the populous
and richer centres should be recognized, and the Courts themselves classified, after the manner adopted in Pennsylvania. In
Pennsylvania the probate jurisdictions are committed to separate
Orphans' Courts only in the more populous centres. The judges
of the Orphans' Courts in Pennsylvania then take rank with the
judges of the Courts of Common Pleas of that State, which I
understand to correspond with our Supreme Court. A judge of
the Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania can sit at will in any other
court of original jurisdiction in the State. He can then hear
criminal or civil cases. This equality of jurisdiction tends to
attract to the Orphans' Courts of Pennsylvania the same high grade
of professional men as those who are attracted to the Courts of
Common Pleas of that State.
It is well understood that the Surrogates' Court in the City
and County of New York, by reason of its situation in a centre of
wealth and population, has greater responsibilities than any other
probate jurisdiction in the world, except possibly the Probate
Division of the High Court of Justice in England which sits for
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all England. It was not the Surrogates' jurisdiction which needed
reforming in 1914. The jurisdiction of the Surrogates' Court of
New York was already, in 1914, more extensive than even that of
the justices of the Probate Division in England. In fact, no other
probate court ever was possessed of such an extended and powerful jurisdiction as that already vested in the Surrogates of the
State of New York before the year 1914. But only in the County
of New York, and possibly in one or two others of the more
populous counties of the State, was that jurisdiction in its full
extent ever, or habitually, invoked. As it was generally invoked
in the County of New York and in that county alone, the practice
and procedure in the Surrogates' Court for this county became
a thing apart, technically and accurately applied, with due formality, whereas in many others of the counties of the State they were
most often technically and in practice ignored.
The legislature itself recognized the distinction between the
counties of the State when they made only the salaries of the
Surrogates of the County of New York equal to that of the
Chief Justice of the United States and larger than that of the
State's governor. The County authorities have also recognized
the fundamental distinction between the different Surrogates'
Courts of the State when they presented the Surrogates' Court
for this county with the largest and finest court rooms ever employed by any single judge in the entire world, no matter how
high his station or rank. No Lord Chancellor of England, or
no Chief Justice of the United States. on Circuit, was ever so
nobly housed as the Surrogates of the County of New York.*
While recognizing, as I do, the utter relative inappropriateness
and even grotesqueness of this splendid accommodation for such
courts as the Surrogates, I merely mention these things in
order to illustrate the general recognition of the fundamental
differences between the business of the Surrogates' Court in this
great and populous county, and that entrusted to the Surrogates'
Courts of some of the thinly inhabited, rural counties of the State
where there is no business of magnitude. Yet the recent "Surrogates' Law" of 1914 takes no note whatever of the greater responsibilities of a Surrogate in this county and reduces all the
*These large court rooms, perhaps not in the best architectural forms,
are notable for their spaciousness and the richness of their excellent

material. Unfortunately, contrary to my expressed wish, they have been
lately much deformed by unusually large and hideous jury boxes, quite
unnecessary in my judgment. I have never known how, in the face of

my express disapproval, these deformities came to be erected.
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Surrogates of the State to the same dead level. Most of the
Surrogaies who revised the new law of 1914 were ignorant of the
conditions of the County of New York. They legislated for this
county without consulting its different requirements.
All this detail just noticed would be of trifling importance, or
rather of no importance, were it not that the lack of a proper
distinction between the various courts of the Surrogates in this
State, deters, I think, many of the properly equipped lawyers
from assuming the responsibilities annexed to the Surrogates'
Bench of this County. With a probate jurisdiction larger and
more extended than that of the distinguished judges of the Probate Division in England a Surrogate of the County of New
York should be relatively as cultivated a lawyer as a justice of
the Probate Division is required to be in England. In England
judges of the Probate Courts are chosen from the most learned
members of the legal profession, and are rewarded by all the
honors which in England go with high judicial station. A Surrogateship in this County offers small inducements to the capable
lawyers at our Bar. Few of them, I fear, could be induced to
accept the office as now constituted. With this in mind I ventured
to suggest to the Constitutional Convention, that in order to obtain
the best material for the Surrogates' Bench, the Surrogates in the
populous centres should be made as eligible for transfer to the
Court of Appeals or the Appellate Division as the Supreme Court
Justices now are. In Pennsylvania the judges of the Orphans'
Courts, for the great cities, possess all the jurisdiction and may
sit at will in any other of the great courts of original jurisdiction
in the State. All the judges of the courts of original jurisdiction
iri Pennsylvania possess the same jurisdiction theoretically. In
practice they sit apart. In other words, a judgeship in the,
Orphans' Courts in Pennsylvania is made equal, and not unequal,
in dignity and-power to any other judgeship in any of the original
courts of the State. This attracts, to the Bench of the Orphans'
Courts in Pennsylvania, the best order of professional talent. In
principle the new Surrogates' Law of New York admits no
primacy, even of responsibility, among the Surrogates' Courts of
the State. To this extent in my judgment the new law is distinctly harmful to the people of the County of New York in as
much as it will tend to deter .many of our best lawyers from any
desire to sit on the Surrogates' Bench of this County. There
are other reasons, however, for their disinclination, which I will
not here mention, except to suggest that the enormous administra-
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tive office, now annexed to the Bench of the Surrogates' Court of
this County, is naturally abhorrent to many men of purely judicial
temper. It is in their minds an 'adjunct incompatible with high
judicial station, and great judicial responsibilities.
In conclusion let me say, that I have written these lines with
the earnest hope that the young university men, who may see fit
to read them, will learn, in their professional life to ccme, to be
partial to a jurisdiction of great antiquity and greater usefulness
and refinement than is, I fear, very generally appreciated by
either the politicians or the people at large.
ROBERT LuDLow FOWLER.

Surrogate, N. Y. County.

